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Introduction 
While there has been a comparatively large literature on African migrants 
circulating between wage labour and agricultural production in the reserves, virtually 
nothing has been written on the state of consciousness of these workers and the 
struggles in which they have engaged. Liberal social scientists, in defence of the 
ri&ts of African workers to live in urban areas, have conceived of migramt workers 
as institutionalized undercutters of wa@;es, and others who have written on the class 
struggles of workers in South Africa consider that repression and labour circulation 
have seriously retarded the consciousness of migrant workers. Simons considers that 
migrant labour is developed by the state as a defence against the emerging African 
proletariat. 
The perpetual rotation of Africans under intensive police 
surveillance has had a crippling effect on African labour 
and political organization. The fear of being 'endorsed 
out1 of towns has been a major deterrent to mass action 
against apartheid. Labour migration accordingly delays 
the process of consolidating Africans into a class- 
conscious proletariat. (1) 
Simons would perhaps argue that migrant workers were capable of national consciousness, 
but that, of necessity, they would not be the class-conscious section of the working 
class as they are emasculated throw the institutionalization of labour circulation. 
In this paper I wish to focus on a period of class struggles during which 
time a comparatively Itfree" form of labour (migrant workers paid on a daily basis in 
the Durban docks) was transformed into contract labour under a strict labour regime. 
This took place at a time of intense conflict in Durban, in which the issues of 
stabilization of the African labour force, employer-state responses to strike action, 
and specifically the formation of an employersf organization to control Labour supply 
in the docks, were discussed and action taken to limit resistance to existing 
structures of labour control. In examining these developments I wish to concentrate 
attention on the struggles of the daily paid (togt) dock workers (both stevedoring 
and. railway workers), who were the moat volatile and class-conscious element within 
the working claae in Durban. 
The struggles of the dock workers had a significant effect on the development 
of administrative measures to deal with labour leadership, on the arguments on how to 
reconcile a smooth-flowing; labour supply with tightened influx control, and on the 
intra-working class relationships between Indian and African workers. The process 
of wage detemin3;tlon was initiated for the large mass of unskilled workers in Durban, 
controls were introduced to contain the flood of workers from the reserves, influx 
control was implemented for the first time ("endorsing out" became a permanent feature 
of urban administration), and new relationships between Indian m d  African political 
arnd industrial orgzmizations were born in the aftermath of the riots of January 1949. 
In Durban, the base was laid for the mass organisation of industrial workers which 
developed in the 1950s with the growth of SACTU (south African Congress of Trade 
Unions), a phenomenon which placed the Durban area as a leading centre of militant 
trade unionism and sustained strike action. 
The dock workers were a silgzificant, although proportionally small, section 
of the total African labour force by the late 1930s. As has been described in a 
number of surveys, the African workers in Durban were concentrated in the tertiary 
sector (a hi& proportion of domestic servants, transport and commercial workers), 
with a @;rowing proportion of workers i.n industry and construction. (2) The dock 
workers made up 43 per cent of the section of transport workers; 22 per cent of 
railwqy workers and 21 per cent of stevedoring workers. (3) The most profound 
characteristic of the African labour market in Durban was the extent of labour 
circulation as evidenced by a preponderance of the working age group (15-60) out of 
the total African population, and an extraordinarily hi& masculinity ratio. (4) 
This notable feature of the African labour force in Durban (possibly similar to 
features of coastal t o m  in the cape) was a result of the emphasis placed before the 
Second World War on retarding urbanization by a variety of measures controlling Taxld 
occupation in urban and peri-urban areas and thro- a state policy reinforcing the 
role of the reserves in reproducing this particular form of labour. Wolpe has , 
argued (5) that, because the means of subsistence and the repmduction of labour 
power have been met from subsistence agriculture, the value of labour power of African 
workers has been reduced. 
When the migrant-labourer has access to means of 
subsistence, outside the capitalist sector, as he 
does in South Africa, then the relationship between 
wages and the cost of the production and reproduction 
of labour-power is changed. That is to s a ~ ,  capital 
is able to pay the worker below the cost of his 
reproduction. (6) 
This azgument applies with particular force to Durban, where the reserves 
are particularly accessible and where economically active males can be more successful 
separated from the household economy, and where,historically, wages have been low 
even in comparison with lesser developed amas such as Port Elizabeth. Ikroq& the 
encouragement of labour circulation on a large scale by a variety of factors, employers 
were able to pay a wage which did not provide for the entire needs of an adult man and 
the cost of raising his family. In 1939/40 the Native Affairs Commission estimated 
that the migrant worker had, in addition to his wages, a qtreserve subsidyt1 of 
approximately £30 per armum. (7) Despite the struggles of African workers and their 
organizations, such as the Indwtrial and Commercial Union, which had a powerful 
branch in Durban, during 1920-1938, the most common wage of African workers in Durban 
was 18s a week - 58 per cent of w-s being between 15s and 20s a week. (8) 
Dock Worker~ and Wage Stwgles duriw the War 
The dock workers of Durban had a long history of resistance to the general 
level of wages in the area and their specific conditions of employment. In a broader 
context they had led the struggles against the imposition of taxes on African labour 
and the institution of a municipal monopoly in beer brewing, In 1940 the dock workers 
wexe a group of approximately 3,000 workers employed by the day by four major 
atevedoring companies and the South African Railways and Harbour. The dock workers 
were employed on average 3-4 da;ys a week because of fluctuations in shipping but also 
because the employers wished to maintain a supply of Labour at a level equal to that 
of the maximum demand which could be made under peak conddtiom. As in all ports which 
have not undergone decasualization, it was in each company's interest to maintain a 
reserve supply of labour over daily average requirements. This reserve also served 
the purpose of encouraging competition among workers for the vacancies every day,  
which, according to classical economic theory, is the means by which wages "reach 
their levelt1. Behind this reserve stood the relative suqlus population of the 
'keseervss" available to replace workers who "struck1' for higher wages at the docks, 
i.e. refused en masse to sign on for the day. 
Accommodation for the dock workers (an issue decided in the 1870s) was in 
barracks constructed by the municipality and some private employers. These barracks 
were constructed so the greatest number of people possible could live in them, 
According to an African resident writing to a radical journal in April 1940: 
there a m  mrrow, dark, winding stairs, that lead to 
the mom occupying the floor above, and the air is 
foul ... for Jd a ma.n is given what passes for a 
bed . . . this consists of the frame of a bed with a 
wooden board in place of the spring .,. the men must 
provide their own blankets ... the rooms are 
terribly stuffy, the windows being situated so high 
that it would be a job to open them .., the lcomfor2;f 
and lrestl to be got from sleeping on a wooden hod 
in a room where a harsh light burns thro~out the 
night must be experienced to be appreciated. (9) 
Barrack accommodation such as this was condemned by the Smit Commission, which 
reported that the Bell Street compound (the primary accommodation for to& workers) 
was tover-crowded, dirty, and quite unfit for the pwrpose for which it was being 
usedl. (10) Apat from some extensian of the premises, no improvements were made. 
The dock workers, who referred to themselves as inyati (buffalo, i.e. strong 
men), had a relatively advanced consciou~lness as they saw themselves llinstrumentalll 
(i.e. the essential, means of production) in khe labour process in the docks; their 
labour was central to all work operations in landing and shipping cargo. Their 
position could be contrasted with those of labourers in inamtry who performed 
l~servi~ell ro es, e.g. sweepers and carriers in garment, leather, footwear, and 
furniture industries, and with the large number of domestic servants who were 
atomized among a large number of employers. Evsn in those industries where African 
workers were advancing into operative positions, such as the metal industry, their 
position was not strategic in the labour process, owing to the relatively low level 
of skill involved in their work and the tight pattern. of skilled/operative/labourer 
relationships. 
The dock workers were the only p u p  of workers in Durban who provided 
leadership from among their own ranks, without relying on an "educated" leadership, 
during the upsurge in or~z;ation in the Second World War. re here was a South 
African Railwags and Harbour Union organized by Philemon Tsele, which operated on a 
national basis, but the dock workers employed by the railwa~rs in Durban owed their 
allegiance to the togt element in the harbour labour force rather than to weekly 
employed workers employed by the railwws.) Some time in 1939 more than 1,000 to& 
workers elected Zulu Phungula as their leader. Phungula was a mi-t worker from 
the Ikopo district in Natal and a fiery opulist leader who would be a key figme 
in the struggles of the dock workers. (117 His style of leadership was clearly 
distinguishable from that of the urbanized intelligentsia who led the African trade 
unions in Durban during the war years. 
The process of wage investigation and determination by the Wage Board set 
in motion by the wage demands of African workers in 1937 in Durban considerably 
heightened the consciousness of dock workers and led to a militant outburst of strike 
activity. Following its investigation, the Wage Board published a wag's determination 
for unskilled labour on 27 September 1940 which benefited 11,410 out of a total of 
15,528 workers (73 per cent) from a minimum wage of 20s a week and 4s a day. (12) 
The to& workers who were already earning 4s a daJr did not benefit at all even though 
their skills were acknowleQed, and the mass of unskilled labourers in Durban were 
brought up to their level. Although their position relative to the average unskilled 
labourerls wage had deteriorated, the dock workers were experiencing a fair 
level of employment because of stimulated war production. In the year 1939 7 40hi* the 
harbour tomage (l harbour ton equals 2,000 lbs) landed at Durban exceeded 2 million 
tom for only the third time in the history of the port, and the total tonnage 
handled increased by 493,911 tons over the previous twelve month period. (13) Ei&t 
months after the wage determination came into operation, during Ma;r 1941, four 
spokesman for the dock workers submitted demands for 8s a day to the Commissioner of 
Native Affairs in Durban, A counter offer was made but not accepted by the workers.(l4) 
Probably stimulated by two other strikes among African workers in July, the 
stevedoring workers came out on strike on l7 August 1941. The strike began initially 
at the Bell Street togt barracks, but soon spread throu&out all barracks housing dock 
workers. The workers demanded 8s per da;y and 10s for working on Sundays. (15) B 
meeting of municipal officials, employers, and the police was held on the same day; the 
stevedoring employers argued that they a d  not object to any increase (the costs would 
simply be transferred to the shipping companies they served), but that the change in 
wages would have to be imposed by government regulation because of long-term contractual 
obligations in the stevedoring trade. A specific wage investigation by the Wage Board 
of the atevedaring trade was rejected as too cumbersome and time cons-, and it was 
decided to call in Ivan Walker (later joint author of 2000 Casualties, a popular history 
of trade unions in South Africa, which does not mention the heroic sttmgglea of the 
Durban dock workers), the Controller of Manpower, to ratify wage increases by 
proclaiming emergency regulations. 
Since a strike in harbour affected the strategic shipping situation, Walker 
was rushed down from Pretoria and discussed the wage issue with two representatives of 
the dock workers: Zulu Phungula and Willle Kuma1o. He chaired a meetiw of employers 
and authorities (16) the day after the strike had begun and brought about agreement on 
a wage of 4s 6d a dqr, a cost of living allowance of not less than 6d per dw, and 
special rates for overtime. The workers' representatives did not agree to these 
propo~ala as they were llnot at the notchtt which they would have liked, but it was agreed 
to p back to work. Despite this offer (17), the dock workers had not accepted that the 
wage issue was closed. In particular, the position of the railwqy workers had not been 
clarified and this was to prove a source of dissatisfaction in the future. 
Wage agitation among dock workers continued and, fearing further strike 
action after a round of strikes by other African workers towards the end of 1941, the 
railway system manager called together a meeting of railwa~r officials and representatives 
of to& workers on 11 March 1942. Phungula argued that the stevedoring employers had 
offered to pay any wage laid down by the government and had agreed to pay 8s per day, 
but now the workers had been cheated out of their increase. He attempted to drive a 
wedge between the state officials and the employers: "it would seem that the 
government is refusing to give us 8s per dw, because our employers have already agreed 
that we should get the 8s." (18) He said the workers had concluded that the government 
was withholding the wage increases. Workers had to pay for accommodation, dipping of 
cattle and taxation, asld were now also being asked to contribute t o m s  the Paramount 
Chieffs War Fund, he argued. In putting forward the wage demands of the dock workers, 
Phunprula was conceiving of a wage which would enable workers and their families to live 
under urban conditions, arguing the case for increased wages for productive workers as 
opposed to white clerical workers, challenging the average going wage for black workers, 
and haplicitly rejecting "scientific" notions such as the poverty datum line as a 
standard for wage increases. 
We have been taught by the Europeans what to eat and we 
like to eat the same things as the European, for instance 
eggEl and tea in the mornings, we would like to fly in 
aeroplanes a.nd drive round in motor cars. The shops are 
fuPl of clothes and motor cars, but we cannot buy these 
things because we have no money ... We do not want 8s a 
day, we want 25s a day [the wage of white clerks employed 
by the stevedoring companies]. Even if we get 8s a d&y 
we will not be satisfied. If we had not agreed with our 
master8 for 8s we would not have asked for that 
t o m  ... the govexnment only gives us m empty dish 
to lick. (19) 
Walker denied outright that it had ever been agreed to pap 88, and said there 
must have been some misunderstanding between workers a d  the stevedoring employers. 
The authorities had an interest in denying this increase (which was the existing wage 
level in Cape Town docks) as it would have changed the cost stmcturs of transport 
considerably and threatened the whole s t m c t w  of wages in Durban. Walker debated 
the issue for a while and then issued an ultFmatumt if the workers did not wish to 
work for less than 8s they could "go home" andl other workers would be reorcited. 
Phunpla rejected these alternatives and countered the threat by telling the officials: I 
"the govement must show us where to go because our homes are here in Durban." 
WaLkersa ultimatum showed a new level of resolution by the authorities to deal 
decisively with the particular conditions of class struggle in Durban and to maintain I 
the overall level of labour circulation in the Durban labour market by blocking the 
"ri&tql to urban life throu@;t.1 increased wages. If necessary, the authorities were l 
prepared to make use of the reserve supply of dock labour &,if this failed,to draw 1 
upon the surplus population in the rural areas. 
Despite the stevedoring trade having been declared a 9'controlled industryt1 
in terms of the emergency regulations of 1941 an& the ultiaatwm of the authorities, a 
hther strike broke out on 28 July 1942. The war govement was placed in a quandasly 
by this latest strike as it did not want to disrupt shipping even fmther by punitive 
counter action. The Department of Labour feared that the use of the military in the 
harbour to break the strike would retard recruitment in the trade when industrial 
peace returned, and forbade the Native Commissioner to introduce scab labour. At the 
same time there was strong pressure for the authorities to come to tern with the 
strikers because of the strategic implications of a major port being disrupted when 
the movement of war material was essential. 
The strike came under the control of Phungula and ten committee members. 
Two daJrs after the strike had begun he was arrested and brought out of prison the 
following daJr on condition that he urge the workers to return to work. But,when he 
was browt before the strikers by the police, in a speech incorporating elements of 
national and class consciousness he told them to carry on the strike. The article 
which appeared in Inkululeko, written by Wilson Cele (a journalist/trade unionist of 
the Communist ~ a r t y r a  vivid account of the oratory and colour of the event. 
When Phungula got out of the car with the police, he 
greeted the people in the style of Shaka. He then 
started to address the public: 'The Dutch people have 
seen that General Botha had fought for them and today 
they sa.y that the Natives are good; we better fight 
and die for what we want until we get it. I do not 
h o w  what will be the outcome of it as they have now . 
even taken our country. Look, we now dig gold for 
them, diamonds for them, and all they do is to sit on 
the chairs which can even reach heaven. What makes 
them not to give us enough money to feed our children? 
The Europeans said: 'Well, go to work.! The strikers 
said !We won't got, and some of the strikers started 
speaking to the public. When the white people found 
out that the strikers were not prepared to go to work, 
they asked Phuner;cla to tell them that if they went to 
work he would bo released, One of the committee members 
than asked the white people if they thought that it was 
Phungulats strike, and told them that all the strikers 
were after was money. After the meeting, M r  Phungula 
told the public that he was prepared to go to jail and 
that the strike should continue. (20) 
The wncompromising militancy of Phungula, the inability of the state to co-opt him 
despite considera.ble pressure, his radical style and imagery, all reflected the type 
of leadership produced by the dock workers. 
The strategy of using Phungula as a hostage having failed, Walker finally 
promulgated War Measure 86 on 31 July 1942, which gave the police the authority to 
expel any to& worker from the municipal area if he refused to work at the prescribed 
wage. Any labomrer refusing to work under these conditions could be fined up to £25 
(equivalent to about 100 days! work for to& labourers) or imprisoned for six rqonths, 
or be liable to both fine and imprisonment. The state used this extreme measure to 
break up the strike, as the to& workers' demands posed a challenge to the whole 
position of unskilled wages in Durban. As it was, strike action gained momentum among 
African workers in industries employing migrant workers in Durban and its hinterland: 
brick and tile, plaster boards, quarrying, and s w r .  A fundamental problem faced by 
the authorities was the loose form of control over employment at the docks: the togt 
system regulated only the relationship between workers and their employers during 
their working hours, and if the labourers decided not to work on a particular day there 
was not much that could be done in terms of the law that could force them to return to 
work, apart from expulsion from the urban area. Contract labour would have made the 
workers liable to prosecution for breach of contract in terms of the service contract 
but was not considered as appropriate to the labour process in the docks at that stage. 
The introduction of scab labour and the threat of expulsion broke the spirit 
of the strikers, who soon returned to work,and Phungula was brou&t to court a few hys 
later. A new pattern for dealing with workers' struggles in Durban was brou&t into 
operation by the threat and enforcement of expulsion, a pattern which become a 
standard formula for the repression of strikes in the harbour area. Negotiations 
would be refuaed and the whole labour force expelled from the municipal area if 
necessary, i.e. the regular workers would be replaced by reserve dock workers and 
migrant labour from the surplus population of the rmral areas. 
Despite the show of strength of the state, Zulu Phungula9s position as leader 
of the dock workers was not endangered. (21) The local Department of Labour encouraged 
him to form a trade union which could be given some form of official recognition. In 
September 1942 the secretary of the Durban Stevedoring Union, Abel M. S. Mhlongo, wrote 
to the local Divisional Inspector requesting this recognition in respectful term. 
"It is hoped that from henceforth grievances will be settled on constitutional lines, 
also that power tactics will be on both sides avoided." (22) At about this time a 
meeting was held between Phungula and Veldtman, Chairman of the Cape Town Stevedores' 
and Dock Workers' Union, at which the veteran labour leader A. W. G. Champion was 
present; this meeting was probably arranged by the Department of Labour. Veld- 
subsequently wrote to the South African police in Durban that peaceful negotiations 
would be used by to& workers and that there would be no more retarding of the war 
effort. (23) By adopting more conventional forms of labour organization, P h w a  
had by no means moderated his position, and a subsequent letter by Phungula and 
Mhlongo to the Controller of Industrial Manpower in Pretoria made further demands of 
the order of 25s per and more. (24) In the negotiations which followed, 
concessions were made to both stevedoring and railway to& workers. (25) Phungu.la was 
told that any further strike action would lead to the immediate replacement of the 
workers, and against this background he accepted the concessiona on the terms offered, 
i.e. a wage freeze binding for two years. Gn this basis the state secured industrial 
peace in the harbour for the w a r  period. 
Trade Unions and Defeated Militancy 
Having secured its position in the harbour, the state was able to deal f i m  
with strike action in other industries in Durban, particularly with those strikes 
involving joint action between African and Indian workers, of which there were a number 
in late 1942 in the paper, laundry, and textile industries. (26) As a result of inte+ 
racial co-operation initiated and sustained by the Communist Party in Durban, a number 
of parallel and independent African trade uniona had been formed in the early 1940s. 
Although the Communist Party provided the initial stimulus and resources for these 
unions, them wa6 little central direction ancP control and a variety of tendencies 
developed, particularly as a number of registered trade unions developed parallel 
unions for African workers under their control. As the number of African workers in 
manuf'&ctwing industry increased, a united working class was essential for strike 
action to be successful. Such unity in the paper board making industry (where African 
workers were in the majority) and in the textile industry (where Indian workers were 
dominant) secured victories in both cases in 1942, (27) 
Encouraged by the growth of industrial militancy a.nd solidarity among workers 
in Ik~~baa, the leadership of registered trade unions representing Indian workers 
(mainly of the National Bloc group of the Natal Indian congress) prepared for decisive 
~ltrike action in 191.3, despite the proclamation of War Measme 145 of 1942 in November 
1942. As S ons argues, the measure confirmed the subordinate position of African 
workers. (28 4 It outlawed strikes by African workers, exposed strikers to @ pmhibitive 
maximum penalty of a e5OO fine or three years1 imprisonment, and bposed cmpulsoqy 
axbitration at the discretion of the Minister of Labour. (29) The struggles which 
resulted from a "forward" policy in organization and strike action met a monolithic 
response from capital and the state sLnd caused a serious setback to working-class 
S twgles . 
The strike at M o p  rubber factory which broke out in early J a n v  1943 was ' 
decisive in unde-ntw radical leadership in registered trade unions and in czus* 
distrust and hostility between Indian and African workem. During the wage dispute, 
which was supported by Indian and African employees of the firm, the employers 
recruited African workers from the reeerves in busloads. (30) Despite the efforts of 
Zulu Phungula, Philemon Tsele of the SAR & H Workers' Union, and Gladman Nxumalo of 
the Metal Workers' Union, the original work force was replaced and no further Indian 
workem were recruited. While there were 378 African workers employed in December 
194.2, in Jkwua,ry 1943 290 of these workem were dismissed, and 581 new workers taken 
on. African employment increased to a peak of 1,250 workers in June Elnd J d y  1945. (31) 
Through a selective use of the reserve slrrqy of labour,in this case as strike breakers, 
labour militancy was curbed for the rest of the w a r  period. Zulu Phungula, who was 
possibly the only person capable of providing inspired leadership to migrant workers, 
was banished from the Durban a m a  for five yews. (32) 
As importantly, management from foreign companies (Dunlops played a leading 
role) and from sectors of induetry in Durban, such as the textile industry and 
stavedoring trade, coalesced in the wake of the Dunlop strike to form the Natal 
Eknployers' Association. This Association aimed to provide specialist information on 
labour issues and "to enable industry to present a united front to extravagant demands 
of organized labour". The Association was to prove essential in co-ordinating the 
policies of employers in different firms and industries towards trade unions, and the 
interests of capital and the state in rega;rd to measures to suppress strike action and 
implement effectively urban regulations directing the flow of African labour supply. 
The effect of the Dunlop strike on Indian workers was to divert organization 
a w w  from trade unions (in particules from unregistered trade d o n s  of Indian and 
Afrioan workers) towards political action in defence of the Indian community. This 
ohaage of dimction (which I cannot discws in this paper) was towards more aggressive 
political action in defence of trading, investment, and residential ri&ts of Indian 
people, and towards inwami looking trade unionism keenly aware of the necessity of 
protecting selected industries and occupations for Indian employment. In the 
atmosphere of political independence for India and the excitement of the passive 
resistance campaign of 1946, contact between Indian and African workers and trade 
unionists became superficial. 
In this situation, the tendency was for African trade unions in Durban to 
develop "on their own lines" (in fact, some took a strong Africanist line, with 
pronounced anti-Indian views) and to avoid collective action with registered trade 
unions. There was, undoubtedly, an increase in hostility between African and Indian 
workers during this period. Africans saw expansion of indmtrbal mploynen% and 
upward mobility in certain industries and occupations (for exmIjle, municipal 
em-ploymsnt and weaving) blocked by Indian workeran The mpid expawion of employment 
in m&nufactur%n.$ to some extent obscured this problem, but,with the downturn of 
economic growth in the immediate post-war period, the lines of demazcation becane 
clearer. In other respects, however, although the relationships between Africavl 
workers aYld the Indian petty bourgeoisie were basically exploitative, these 
relationships did facilitate urbanization of African families in areas such as Cato 
Manor, provide basic infrastructure services such as bus services aYld retail 
outlets - all services which could be provided because of the particdar position of 
Indian people as a "buffer groups' in the racial hierarchy of urban segregation. In 
the Cato Maaor area there were only a few shacks in 19325 by 1939 their number ksad 
gwwn to 500, and by 1944 there were some 3,000 shcks houaing about 17,000 people. (33) 
About half of the African population in Durban was estimated to be living in shmk 
slwns on Indian owned land. Some of these workers were dock workers who caught the 
early buses into the harbour area. 
The demand for African labour increased steadily throughout the war years 
in the greater Durban area, stimulated by increased war production and by major 
construction projects in the area. In the immediate post-war period (1945-46 to 
1946-47), however, the pace of African employment slackened quite seriously. 
Coupled with these fluctuations in employment opportunities, which were partially made 
up by rapid employment growth in 1947-48, was evidence of a serious decline in real 
wages of African workers in the Durban area. In her study of industry in greater 
Durban area, Katzen records an an.nua.1 decline in wages of African workers at constant 
(1937-38) prices between 1946-47 and 1949-50. (35) 
Peasant Production, Influx Control and Unemloyment Insurance 
The uneven development in employment and wages of African workers in the 
immediate post-war period was coupled with drought conditions in many areas of Natal 
and Zululand, a factor increasing the "push" factors from subsi~ltence agriculhre. 
Drought conditions were widespread during the year 1944-45r a p d  f m m  the southern 
coastal areas, and Msinga and Ladysmith areas were particularly badly hit, the latter 
being declared a drought area. Cattle losses were particularly heavy in Msinga, 
Ladysmith, Nongoma, and Hlabisa districts, and there was a severe shortage of 
mealies. (36) The following year, 1945-46, did not bring relief. There was drought 
again in maay areas of the province, a severe loss of cattle, and a great reduction . 
in harvests. As in the previous year, special arrangements had to be made to ensure 
that the available mealie supplies were equitably distributed. (37) The migmnt 
workers of Natal end Zululand had experienced considerable impoverishment by the end 
of the 1940s. In some areas it would not be an exaggeration to talk of the collapse 
of peasant production, while in the few districts where cereal production waa increasing 
the total output could support only a fraction of the total population of the district. 
Rapidly declining peasant production meant that the amount of maize imported into each 
district increased proportionately, which resulted in heavier dependence on wage labour 
by migrant workers. (38) 
Partially in response to the fluctuations in employment levels of African 
workers within the urban area, but more specifically in reaction to the increased flow 
of migrant labour to Durban, for the first time in Dmbants histosy the implementation 
of influx control was seriously considered. The first controls over the direction of 
flow of labour were, however, controls over movement fron the reserve areas. On 
completion of large scale was contracts for the Defence Depatment and the Admiralty 
in 1944, lmge numbers of African workers were discharged from employment, and 
suggestions were made to restrict the flow of labour to the city. At the request of 
the City Council the Chief Native Commissioner circularized all magistrates in Natal 
and Zululad to restrict the flow of labour to Durban until employment expanded 
again. (39) In Durban itself, a campaign was initiated of police raids at ni&t to 
check on the validity of passes. The considerable decline in employment between 
1945 and 1947 was probably the stimulus for the formula agreed upon in 1946 to 
tighten controls over the presence of Africans in Durban and to initiate criminal 
proceeding8 against those workers not registered with the Native Administration 
Department. (40) 
Arising from increased resistance to representative bodies and to the 
tig%tening of controls over mobiliCy of African people, a Commission was appointed 
to investi@te the grievances of Africans, in 1947. Justice F. N. Broome, the 
Comission~s, reported that moslt whites tho-t the "Native problem" of Durban could 
be solved. by expelling redundant African workers from the area. Representative of 
this opinion was an article in a Durban newspaper which reported that between 3,000 
and 4,000 African "vagrantst1 had been repatriated to the reserves by the Native 
Affairs Department in 1947. "Substantial as this number is, the problem of Durbanss 
surplus Native population is as serious as ever . . .I1, the newspaper concluded. (41) 
Broome, however, defended the maintenance of a reserve supply of labour within an 
urban area, in particular to meet the requirements of seasonal industries (Durban has 
a marked holiday season) and the harbour. 
The demands of industry ... fluctuate; all Native 
labourers cannot be employed all the time. But the 
requirements of industry demand that there shall be 
readily available a reservoir of labour that can be 
drawn upon to meet seasonal demands. This is 
pa~lticulasly the case in the harbour area. (42) 
The arguments over the necessity to limit the reserve supply of labourers 
in the urban area and the contrary demands of agriculture came to a head over the 
issue of unemployment insurance for African workers. The implementation of the 
Unemployment Insurance Act of 1946 made possible a relatively stabilized urban 
proletariat to meet the fluctuations in demand for industrially experienced African 
labour. Since the Act did not expressly exclude migrant workers, it received the 
fierce opposition of organised agriculture which complained vociferously that migrant 
labour was being diverted from agriculture to industry. (43) Following an allegation 
by the Assistant Native Commissioner for Natal that large numbers of African workers 
were drawing benefits from the unemployment insurance fund, organized agriculture in 
Natal inundated Members of Parliament with letters Iwd t e l e ~ ~  demanding that 
Africans should be excluded from the Act entirely and the existing recipients of 
benefits be placed in agricultural employment. (44) Despite the continued increase 
in African employment in industry in the late 19408, African workers struggling to 
maintain themselves and their families in urban conditions were under pressure from 
Native Administration officials, landowners threatening eviction, and declining real 
wages. The few benefits for urban African workers were under pressure and would be 
restricted later. 
General Strike or Racial Conflict? 
African orgadzations such as co-operatives (of which there were 95 in Natal 
in 1946) and trade unions were unable to meet the demands of the time, and particularly 
the needs of the migraurt workers. Gilbert Coka (a journalist and foraer ICU organizer) 
described the trade unions in 1948 as "fast going to sleepqt, and argued that there had 
been a backwaxd trend in political organization. (45) Zulu Phmgula, who had completed 
his time of banishment, returned to Durban in l948 to take up his former occupation of 
to& worker. On 20 September 1948 he issued a report on the problems of m i w t  
workers in relation to peasant production, describing unemployment, urbanization, under- 
investment in crop production, rural over-population, and concluding with a demand for 
hi&er wages. (46) The main problem, he felt (probably acutely as a to& worker) ,was 
employment for the waves of &grant workers stremiq into Durban: "One generation came 
in yesterday (by train) . . . all this generation will never get work." Urbanization 
of women was taking place with the aim of supplementing male wages to provide 
collectiv~1y for the children, and illicit brewing (isiqata) was essential for the 
family. to survive. Peasant production, he argued, was becoming impossible because 
the land had been appropriated by the state for white farmers ("its all farms all 
over") and intensive farming required a much hi&er level of capital investment. 
Ploughing requires oxen and oxen require grazing 
grounds and they cost money because we haven't got 
them ... we have got to hire them. Cultivators, 
rakes, sowing machines (planters) etc. all cost 
money How can one plough because all this [costs] 
money? A Native has not the money. 
A relatively 1- surplus population was growing in the reserve areas as a product 'of 
the homestead eqanding within a confined land area. 
Zn the location my grandfather had 5 wives and 20 
young men. Let me mention one hut of the 5. P& 
father had 4 brothers. His elder brother married 
2 wives, the second had 4 wives, my father had 2, 
the other had 2 and the 5th had 3 wives. I am not 
mentioning the 15 half-brothers to him. Let us now 
look back to qy father's brothers living on the area 
where my grandfather lived. Is this not crowded, 
became the land does not expand? Which place can 
be plomed by the present generation? 
Phungulats solution to these problems was to put forward a demand for an 
increase in wages to $1.5~ per dqy, or $32.10~ per month. h e d  with these proposals, 
he approached the African trade unions and political organizations in Durban. He 
asked a leading member of the African National Workers Federation, Christopher 
Mbonambi, for support for a general strike, including all races, across industrial 
divisions, for a demand of a minimum wage of at least El a day: a demand which was 
highly popular among the workers. Mbonambi told Phungula he was putting forward. a 
revolutionazy demand which would be quite impossible to accomplish. (47) As the 
rumours spread through Durban the Divisional Inspector of Labour called in Mbonaanbi 
and warned him of the consequences of a general strike. He told Mbombf to instruct 
workers that demands should be put in a '9constitutional" way, industry by industry, 
and that the strike movement m t  be stopped. MBonambi arnmged a large meeting at 
the Bantu Social Centre, at which PhunguPa was called upon to explain his strategy. 
The meeting, which was attended by the Department of Labour officials, the Security 
Branch, and secretaries of African trade unions, gave Mbombi a "nasty time" in the 
beginning. He explained to the workers how to make demands in tern of the existing 
regulations promulgated in tern of War Measure 145 of 1942, and said it would be 
impossible to get to $1 from an existing wage of 5s a dqy: a demand should be made 
somewhere betweeen. Gradually, despite the popular feeling for a general strike, he 
won the workers over to his gradualist approach. PhunguPa returned to his fellow 
dock workers, "those were the people who understood him well, they did not want to 
understand what we said at the meeting1', said Mbonambi later. Although in retreat, 
Phungula did not change his views. "He would test out his ideas among the people 
and when he had the ri&t response nothing would move him from his standp~ht.~' (48) 
Despite opposition from the African trade unionists of the time, Ph-a 
had correctly assessed the mood of the African workers and their desire for mass 
action to change their conditions. Instead of class action, the African workers 
turned against Indian people - both petty bourgeois shopkeepers and landowners and 
working class strata. 
The riots broke out on 13 January 1949 in the afternoon,after an incieent 
between an African youth and an Indian shop assistant. (49) In the riots which 
followed, 142 people were killed: l White, 50 Indians, 87 Africans, and 4 "othersw; 
a large number of people were injured, and considerable amounts of property were 
destroyed or damaged. African workers housed in compounb, and the .to& workers in 
particular, took a leading p m t  i n  the violence a@inst Indian people, E s ~ a u  Laflete, 
considered by the authorities t o  be the spokesman f o r  Cato Manor, said i n  evidence t o  
the Comission of Inquiry which followed that the worst attackers of Indian property 
i n  Cato -or came from the Point bazracks i n  the dock area, through the central area 
of the town into Booth Road, and then on into Cato Manor i t s e l f .  (50) In. the Report 
of the Conmission, the f ac t  that; African males were "herded togethern i n  compounds 
was considered a contributing factor  to the r io ts .  s'Such CO gations of men a m  
ready tinder to  any spark, and it is  clear  that  the compound-iiwellsrs took an 
hpoxlant part i n  the excesses.'' (51) I n  h is  evidence t o  the Conmission of Enquiry, 
P h w a  proposed a radical solution to  rac ia l  conflict and redirected attention to 
the role of the s t a t e  generating antagonism among rac ia l  groups. 
Ny Lord th i s  land of ours is i n  a s t a t e  of great 
confusion, it is a country that  has already been 
steeped i n  blood .,. i f  we had our way we would t e l l  
the GovernmellC ... 'you are no longer competent t o  
govern th i s  couxitry, it w i l l  be be t te r  f o r  you t o  
hand it over t o  the coloured people" (52) 
Thou& selective legislation, the s t a t e  had given Indian people privileges over 
African people, whose hearts "are red because of the encouragement which the Govement 
gives t o  the Indiana to  lord it over usqe". (53) T h m  force of arms African people 
had become subordinate and would fight back if  they had the necessary weapons; "the 
government is  a v e q  grave r to  us . . .lt (54) Binally, however, he succumbed to  
the mass S e e l i r q  of the time an3 f e l t  that  the Indian people should be repatriated, 
even though they were only as  much foreign as  the Whites. 
Phungula had not given up h is  idea of a general s t r ike  to  change the wage 
structure of Durban. W l y  i n  April he called a meeting of bucket workers employed 
by the Durban Corporation and said t h a t  i f  the employers did not l i s t e n  t o  the demands 
of the workers a general s t r ike  would be called. (55) Later that  month, he issued a 
pamphlet as  President of the Natal Zulu National Workerst Union, cal l ing on a l l  African 
workem i n  the Durban area t o  s t r ike  f o r  832.10s a month if  th i s  d-emd waa not met 
from 1 m. (56) The s t r ike  be- on Monday, 2 May 194gr when,acco to  press 
reports, 800 stevedoring workers refused to  st& work. The s t r ike  movement spread 
and involved workers i n  the ship painting, baking ancl milling, whaling, timber, sugar 
and chemical indus.tries. Armed police were called out and were i s l s tmen ta l  i n  forcing 
the s tr ikers  back t o  work. The general s t r lke  did not have the momentum that Phwqy3.a 
would have wished (he was arrested on the first day), but it was certainly more wide- 
spread than newspaper reports described. The s t r ike  also had the dist inct ion of being 
the f i r s t  general s t r ike  of Afrioan workers i n  Durban, and popularised the wage demand 
of $31 a day, a slogan which was the demand of SACTlS i n  the 3950s. (57) 
Phungula was brought before the Native Commissioner~s Court on the first day 
of the s t r ike  fo r  a Judicial inquiry in t e r m  of Section 29 (the 
the Native (Urban   re as) Act of 1.945. The court was f i l l e d  with African workers and 
armed police. Evidence was led that Phungula had no visible  meanEl of support as  leader 
of the Natal Zulu National Workers! Union, which did not keep proper books of account, 
and that  he had worked only f ive days i n  1948. (58) Phungula said that the people he 
organized gave him money fo r  food and collections were taken a t  meetings, and that he 
had been unemployed fo r  long periods because the employers called him "Hitlers' and 
would not take him on. (59) After hearing evidence that Phungula had persisted i n  
making wexcessive~~ wage demands a t  a time when tensions had not subsided a f t e r  -&he 
r io t s ,  the Assistant Bantu Affairs Commissioner, J. J. M. Stander, ordered that  he be 
banished to  Ixopo f o r  ten years and not be allowed t o  re- t o  Durban. (60) 
Phmgula's bcwishment was a prelude to  a vigorous reassessment of the controls over 
to& labour and a determination to  crush militancy i n  the harbour -a. 
D u r i n g  the early 1950s the stevedoring companies, the municipality, and the 
s t a t e  pappled with the problems of maintaining polieies which could be i n  conflict: 
influx nnd tighter adminiatrative controls, a low wage structure, m d  curbs on 
militancy. The pro'blsm essentially was to ensure access to a reserve army of labour 
for employers with a state policy of influx control and regulation of all service 
contracts. The inmediate problem of the state in the post-riot situation was to 
lirnit the number of surplus workers who could be dram into radical political and 
industrial action. Investigations were made by officials of the Native Administration 
Department into the number of workless African people in the Garban area, and wide 
publicity was given to the fi@;ure of 10,000 "surplusn Africw. (61) On 8 July 1949 
it waa decided to take decisive action: the Durban City Council decided to enforce 
strictly the provisions of Proclamation 39 of 1940, providing for prohibition of 
entry of African work seekers into the urban mea if there was already full 
employment, and for the removal of all unemployed Africans. (62) The implementation 
of influx control had an immediate effect on African work seekers streaming; in from 
the rural areas. The Native Comm;Lssioner for Natal reported that may Africans could 
not find the work they wanted to do and were forced to accept work at lower wagt3s; 
in this seme the regvlations were serving the function of redirecting labom - 
depressing wages. The Native Commissioner for Durban reported that the restrictions 
had resulted in the reduction of the estimated surplus of At'rican workers in &zrba;la 
from 10,000 to 6,000. (63) 
While theae restrictions were implemented with the general consent of 
empl.oyers throu& their representative organizations, the effects of a restricted and 
directed labour supply affected oerbaia p u p s  of employers more than others. The 
employers of to& labour were most directly affected and %heir position was M h e r  
aggravated by the City Cowroilvs policy of refusing to issue ti~yr further to& licences 
until further accomodation was provided by the employers. FoYlowing some anxious 
negotiations and an appeal to the Minister of Native Affairs, a temporary 
administrative suspension of part of the regulations restricting the issue of togt 
licences to the amount of suitable accommodation available was made, and. the supply 
of togt labour restored. As a quid pro WO, the stevedoring employers w e e d  to 
extend the existing accommodahion to provide for 1,500 labourers. With the 
implementation of the national system of labour bureaux further concessions were 
granted to to& employers to avoid the employers having to register service contracts 
every &Y. (64) 
In the short-term, the regulations enabled workers to take advantage of their 
relative scarcity onoe they had been re~istered, and employers complained that some 
workers were adopting llselective a%titudesm in the kind of work they were prepared to 
do. Despite the banishment of Ph@a and the implementation of urban controls, 
strikes con-tinued in the dock area. After a variety of strikes in the early 19508, 
the stevedoring to& workers came out on strike on P July 1954 with a demand for 
4s.gd a da;y wage increase. The strike, in which the painting; to& workem joined, 
was well orgmized,with pickets thmu&out the harbour area who acted against scab 
labour. (65) Finally, the Chairman of the Central Native Labour Boam3, S. D. Mentz, 
addressed the strikers with armed police standing by, told them to appoint spokesmen, 
and threatened to have them replaced unless they acted on his advice. The strikers 
used the occasion to demand the return of Zulu Phungda: 
When we are speaking to our employers the Government 
interferes. The man we want back to speak for us has 
been taken away. We are still looking for him. (66) 
Despite the ultimatum, they refused to appoint a spokesman, and the company 
served notices on the workers either to back to work within 24 hours or be chaxged 
with trespass. Ne@;otiati.ons began on 8 July between the Central Native Labour Board, 
executives of Durban stevedoring companies, and nine spokesmen for the to& 
stevedores. (67) The stevedoring conpanies finally conceded an increase of ls.3d per 
W ,  with a variety of smaller increments. Mmtz recommended the establishment of a 
permanent labour force on a weekly or monthly basis, "the number of men to be employed 
based on the lower number of men employed during any week over the past yearw, (68) 
Such a system would not eliminate the necessity for casual labour but would reduce 
the reliance of the stevedoring trade on this form of labour. ?hxther strikes and 
negotiations with the Central Native Labour Board. followed in 1954 axrd 1956, in which 
the workers were assisted by Bafana lvlajosi and Stephen D= of S a w .  
In the late 1950s the conflict between the stevedoring employers and the 
state, which had temporarily been resolved in 1950, flared up again. In November 
l957 the Minister of Native Affairs, Dr B. F. Verwoerd, announced that most of the 
stevedoring compounds at the Point dock area would have to go and that only 2,000 
African stevedores would be allowed in that area. (69) Eknployers of labour in the 
dock area protested that there would be a serious decline in the efficiency of work 
at the hmbour if the workers were housed at Kwa Mashu to the north of Durban, %hat 
they would possibly refuse to work overtime because of the long hours which they 
would be away from their homes, and that there was a possibility that Durban would 
be by-passed by ships which would be averted to Louren~o Marques. The Stevedores" 
Association, which housed 1,520 workers, su'bmitted a megloray~dum to %he Government 
pointing out the "serious reperc~~~13~lions" which could follow if their cornpounds had 
to be demolished. (70) While the future of to& labour was being discussed by 
officials, the workers responded to tke call of the African National Congess for a 
t h e - b y  stay-at-home. 
While this strike in April 1958 had mixed success as a national movement, 
the stevedoring to& workers responded by refusing to work overthe - a sophisticated 
tactic as overtime was theoretically voluntary. The standard amount of overtime was 
four h o w ,  but from Monday, 14 April 1958, the workers refused to work after 5 p.m. 
At first no demands were made, but on the Sun- after the overtime ban had 
begun the workers refused to report for work and demanded hi@ter -S. Negotiations 
between the workers and employers followed, and the to& workers gained an increase 
of ls.6d per da;y with improved conditions of overtime and better S W a t P S o  (73-1 
The disruption browt about by strike action (the April, strike caused 
considerable congestion in the docks), the official policy of tighter control over 
surplus labour, contracts of service and accommodation, and the employers8 desire to 
control militancy, bro-t all parties together for negotiations. The Natal Ekqloyemt 
Assoaiation bromt the employers, the Department of Labour, the Department of Native 
Administration and municipal officials together on 27 November 1958. The cMrma;n of 
the meeting, a stevedoring employer, said the meeting had been called to extend 
controler over stevedoring labour and to eliminate the to& labour system. A 
centrally administered compound system had been accepted by the Durban Stevedores' 
Association,which controlled the large compounds,as an answer to the "complete lack 
of discipline over the to& labour forceg1. The new system would be introduced by 
the foraation of a sepaxate non-profit making company which would have, as its 
directors, nominees of each of the existing skevedoring companies in Durban. !This 
company would then control all the barracks then owned by the various companies and 
all employers would draw on the labour of the labour supply conpimy. While previously 
a labour out of favour with one company could find emplopent at another compaqy, with 
the new system of labour control qfundesirabletl labour would be e l W t e d .  (72) 
The approval of the Departsnent of Native Administration was essential to the 
plan. The Assistant Secretary of the national Department of Native Affairs, 
H. L. Srnuts, outlined the polioy of the government to the meeting. He felt that, 
although there was a m a t  amount of work to be done in the "cleaning up" of Durban, 
he could see "no objectiorl .whatsoevergt o the accommodation controlled by the labour 
supply company. (73) The labour supply company woula exercise complete discipline 
over the workers, and the only aspect not controlled by it would be the actual 
authorization of the workers to be in the urban area, which would remain with the 
local authority. In this wa;y the contradictions between the state and employers would 
be resolved. 
The officials were all in favour of the supply company, although the 
Divisional Impector of Labour correctly forecast trouble in the tzaxmition from 
to& to a monthly contract system of employment. He optimistically foresaw that the 
new form of control would permit "weeding out troublemakers" in a short time and 
"peace in the industry for the rest of your lives". Such were the hopes and 
anticipations of the Durban Stevedoring Labour Supply Company. (74) 
A8 fossseen, there ware severe d i f f i o d t i e s  i n  changing the s t x u c t w  of 
employment i n  tbgi stavedoring trade to  contract labour, The M e d i a t e  cause fo r  
further s tr ike action by to& workers, however, was the wage l a i d  down f o r  s t e v e d o r i ~  
labourers i n  the first wag= detemination fo r  the stevedoring trade, 'Phe Wage Board 
had investigated the trade i n  1958 and had received evidence from the local  committee 
of SACTTJ that some workers were without employment fo r  weeks, that the workers should 
be paid weekly, and that  there should be considerable increase i n  wages. (75) The 
workers had looked to  the Wage Board fo r  rel ief  but Wage Determination 183 provided 
I no wage increase f o r  labourers, l a id  down different ial  ra tes  f o r  winchmen and €FWYW- 
I 
men, and included large increases f o r  indunas (foremen), a group which employers were 
attemptina; to reinforce. The s t r ike  broke out on 24 Febmaay, when it becane known 
them would be no increases fo r  labowcers and 4s increase for  indunas. Two stevedoring 
labourers were arrested on a c h m e  of assaulting an induna i n  a compound, and the 
workers demanded a pay increase proportionate t o  that granted t o  the indunas. (76) 
Instead of nelfotiations the employexs, Department of Labour, and the police went 
l ahead with the p l m  t o  force the labour supply oompany on the workers. A l l  the s t r ikers  wen3 disan$ssed and ordered to  leave the p d s e s  of the stevedoring companies, a 'baton 
l c&& was made, and about 80 men arrested. (77) The companies took a d v a t a m  of the 1 now desperate desire of the workers to regain enplopent to  introduce the labour supply 
I company, and the majority of the s t r ikers ,  together with other workers, were re-e-d 
l on a per?nanent basis. But the men objected to  the new arrangements on the munds that  
they could earn more under the previous system i f  work were available throughout the l week (84s per week) a s  opposed t o  the 60s weekly wage. Again, they refused to  work 
overtime, and congestion i n  the harbour resulted. A severe c r i s i s  resulted as labour 
discipline was being threatened with possible s trategic inzplications if linked t o  a 
further national stay-at-home movement. The employers then dismissed the ent i re  labour 
I force and recruited new workers from Zululand t o  take the i r  places. (78) Tn t h i s  way 
~ 
the successful operation of the labour supply compaay was secused. The pattern of mass 
discipline established during the war and challenged by the technique of refusing t o  
work overtime was again enforced t o  break the workers' resistance t o  a system they 
correctly saw as  dramatically increasing the i r  employersf control over t h e i r  labour. 
Conclusions 
I n  th is  paper I have s e t  out t o  examine the comciousness of: a part icular  
group of migrant workers as  exemplified by the i r  cjocial actions, t he i r  demands, and the 
ideology of the i r  leaders. A s  a leader, Zula Phungzila was (79) possibly unique i n  
ar t iculat ing the ideology and dernands of the migrant workers and having h i s  utterances 
recorded by c i v i l  service stenopaphers. Ph-a w a s  able to  avoid the worst aspects 
of labour organization (despite h i s  inabi l i ty  to  keep proper financial records!): the 
buxeaucratization of the ICU, with its internal  confusions and financial excesses,&nd 
the limited industrial s t rategies of the African trade unions of the w a r  period. These 
industrial unions survived during the war period &er a f a i r l y  benign. Department of 
Labour, but, with the r i s e  to  power of the National Party, those i n  3-mBa;n collapsed 
without a struggle. (80) Despite being described as  a "one man show", he was able t o  
avoid a l l  forms of personality cu l t  (compare him to  the "great leader" s ty l e  of 
A. W. G. champion) a d  t r i ed  t o  carry out a wage campaiga which would have revolutionized 
the wage structure of Durban and had decisive effects  on peasant production i n  the 
reserves. H i s  strategy was, however, limited by the repressive power of the s ta te ,  
although even here he l a id  down an organization in the compounds which evidence suggests 
may have survived to  the present. 
Poulantzas argues that  the dominant ideology of a social fonnation pe-eates 
even the pol i t ica l  language azad ideas of the dominated classes, whose "own" po l i t i ca l  
ideology i s  often modelled on that of the dominant ideology of legitimacy. 
The dominated classes l ive  the i r  conditiom of po l i t i ca l  
existence through the forms of dominant po l i t i ca l  
discourse: th i s  means tha t  often they l ive  even the i r  
revolt against the domination of the system within the 
frame of reference of the dominant legitimacy. (81) 
He uses this argument to  explain the possibi l i ty  of lack of "class comciousness" i n  
do~ninated clasfiea, Thia asgunent has particular force when applied to the ideology 
of racism in Xbirth Africa, and Phungula was exceptional in that he could use the 
dominant legitimacy to justify a par%icular struggle, and yet on occasion confront the 
dominant legitimacy with powerful counter argment. In his manipulation of ide01og;y 
he was prepared to "play both ends" of the migrant labour system: demanding a wage 
which would make it possible for the worker and his family to live in an urban area, 
and, alternatively, use rural impoverishment as an arpent for such a wage. In many 
respects he was able to draw attention to the connection between the wage struggle 
and. the struggle in the m a l  areas - a connection which fuelled the wage aazd 'speasantll 
struggles of the late 1950s in Natal. 
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